novels in Northanger Abbey, Catherine Morland certainly thought so. And so did Lord Kames, who explained in his Elements of Criticism that it was the engagement of the imagination alone which brought history home to the reader's bosom: 'History cannot reach the heart, while we indulge any reflection upon the facts. [...] And if such reflection is laid aside, history stands upon the same footing with fable [...] [and] fable is generally more successful than history'.
5
I want to test some of these queries and doubts against a period when conjectural history met its first great challenge, and what it hoped would be its vindication, namely the eighteenth-century navigations of the South Seas. And then I mean to bring the discussion home, or almost home, again by examining Samuel Johnson's sole attempt at ethnographical history, his Journey to the Western Isles of Scotland. I want to consider why it is that individual stories about crossing the beach, that permeable boundary identified by Greg Dening not simply as the threshold dividing the Stranger from the Native but also the past from the present, resist a factual narrative. If the beach costs those who traverse it a change or metamorphosis not easily recorded as factual testimony, no less does the past demand, according to Dening, that the historian 'go native' if he or she is to have any chance of representing it. 6 So we are talking about a double threshold, in space and time.
In the mid-eighteenth century European navigators found islands not known by them to have existed, places where modes of production and reproduction were so novel that even a man as literal-minded as James Cook thought he might have stumbled across the terrestrial paradise. In Tahiti men and women, he observed, went naked without shame, had sex in the open, and found their bread not in the sweat of their brows but in the branches of trees. Bougainville's report of the Paphian utopia Tahiti gave Diderot the idea for one the subtlest Enlightenment speculations on sexuality and its relation to social structures. Setting aside the question of historical veracity, he suggested that the Pacific was an 'ocean of fantasy', a place where all experiences appeared to have been imagined, either because they were so incomparably exotic, out of time and entered like a dream, or because the civilised mind stands in need of alibis for its most daring imaginings.
Enthusiasts and sceptics alike compared the reports from the Pacific to the passages of romance.
Peter Heylyn had already supposed that The Faerie Queene had been situated in the terra incognita, that mysterious cartographical entity one of whose actual fragments, Aotearoa/New Zealand, was later illustrated and explained by Sir George Grey with quotations from Spenser's romance.
There were giants too, such as the Patagonians who towered over their European visitors, and cannibals almost everywhere, not to mention naked damsels who made lascivious offers of their bodies to Odyssean seamen. These extravagances earned the genial incredulity of Diderot, Walpole, and Voltaire when they invented their fictions of the strange customs of the Southern Hemisphere.
One of the strangest of these was the anonymous The Travels of Hildebrand Bowman (1778).
The story begins with an actual cannibal event which befell the crew of the Adventure's cutter on Cook's second voyage, when eleven men were killed and partly eaten at Grass Cove, in New Zealand's Queen Charlotte Sound. The fictional twelfth, Bowman, makes his escape and commences a journey through time that corresponds to the aesthetic development of human senses, culminating in the modern age of Luxo-Volupto whose inhabitants experience 'Touch or Feeling in as exquisite a degree as human nature is capable of supporting without turning pleasure into pain'. 7 Hildebrand Bowman is interesting not simply because it emphasises the importance of sensory information in European encounters with strange places and peoples, but more significantly because it unites an idea of history, specifically stadial history, with a narrative of encounters between the hero and societies at different stages of what stadialists would term progress. Yet it is plain the author sees no definite calibration between civility and technology since Luxo Volupto is represented as both sophisticated and corrupt. For him and for others cannibalism is not necessarily a zero degree of savagery, nor were the events at Grass Cove entirely owing to spontaneous Maori aggression. Cook himself refused to punish the perpetrator, a chief called Kahura, because he was not convinced that the blame lay entirely on his side-a decision which led (according to Anne Salmond) to the alienation of Cook from his crew and the bizarre acts that precipitated his death in Hawai'i.
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So this blunder on the beach propels two singular narratives: the perpetually imperfect historical account of Cook's death, bringing full circle a tale of fatal violence between Strangers and Natives; and the fictional travels of Bowman, which begin and end with questions of primitivism and taste. That Bowman's fictional history should be framed according to the stages of human progress is intriguing on two counts: first because it is obviously the fictional embroidery of a cannibal feast, something metropolitan audiences found difficult to accept. Second, it offers itself (in spite of its improbability) in proper experimental form as eyewitness testimony. All the equipment of virtual witnessing is wheeled in to emphasise the fantastic basis of a structure of historical conjecture. With regard to stadial historians Mary Poovey has pointed out, 'What they wanted to describe-the origins of modern society, and especially how "rude" societies became "civilised"-had not been recorded by witnesses.' So they had to fill up the empty spaces in the account with abstractions that were treated by them as real entities, but which were in effect no different from fictions. 9 In order to buttress these abstractions stadialists such as John Millar, as well as sceptical historians such as Adam Ferguson, were raiding the voyage literature of the mid-century for eyewitness evidence of the truth or fiction of conjecture-in Millar's case, facts that would show human society evolving in a predictable four-part sequence. In his Observations concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society (1771) he had traced social development from hunting and gathering to pastoral nomadism, thence to agriculture and finally to doux commerce, ending at exactly the same terminus as Bowman but with a very different inflection. While no single witness had access to the whole process, as Bowman claims, merely to momentary encounters such as that which went so badly wrong at Grass Cove, it was possible now to write a stadial history based on some evidence, not just conjecture. It was also possible to date true heroism from the earliest times and its extinction from the most recent, as Ferguson did. But there was a risk of course that further empirical knowledge might shatter the symmetry of what had been conceived as a coherent history either of progress or decline, leaving shreds of fiction where a brave hypothesis used to stand.
Stadial history was built on the rivalry between two theories concerning the origins of humans. There were those who believed in polygenesis, namely that inhabitants of different regions were originally quite distinct, growing from a unique stock, and always bearing the same distinguishing features of their race or nation. Thus Lord Kames, a powerful advocate of this position, argued that chance has nothing to do with differences in what he called national character, and that national history was defined by this character, not by the development of techniques of production:
Where the greatest part of a nation is of one character, education and example may extend it over the whole; but the character of that greater part can have no foundation but nature. What resource then have we for explaining the opposite manners of the islanders [of the South Seas], but that they are of different races?
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The stadial position was founded on monogenesis, where a single human species acquired wide variations as the factors of soil, climate and geology operated on it; but with the advance of time these transformations were compounded by supplemental causes, such as property, gender, mobility and exchange.
One of the most eminent advocates of monogenesis was the cantankerous Johann Reinhold Forster, the official natural historian on Cook's second voyage to the South Seas (1772-5), who used the laboratory of the Pacific to make the first serious attempts at comparative ethnology.
Correctly assuming that the Polynesian islands, stretching from Aotearoa/New Zealand in the west to Rapanui (Easter Island) in the east, had been colonised in a general migration eastwards from Malaysia by a people of the same original culture and language, he had on the Resolution an unrivalled platform from which to view variations in environment and their correlations in physique, complexion and temperament: 'Nay, they often produce a material difference in the color, habits, and forms of the human species'.
11 In the Polynesian diaspora, the inhabitants of the Society Islands (Tahiti and its neighbouring islands) came out on top, in Forster's opinion, with a climate so pleasant, vegetation so lush, and seas so bountiful that there emerged not only a distinctive colouring, muscle tone, and stature, but also an opulent chiefly system of government, together with priestcraft, property, and sea-borne traffic. Near to the bottom came the inhabitants of Dusky Bay, in the south of New Zealand's South Island, who were poor, violent and ill-conditioned; but not so utterly wretched as the non-Polynesians of Tierra del Fuego, a benighted people who stood at the bottom of Forster's scale.
Forster's study of Polynesian cultures was very different from Pierre Lafitau's of the Iroquois or Peter Kolb's of the Hottentots, where the focus on a single national object precluded compar-ative judgments.
12 When Burke said that navigators such as Cook had unrolled the great map of mankind, he was using a cartographical metaphor to make sense of the kind of anthropological history Forster was writing. Here spread out was a history of human society, from its most primitive beginnings to complex institutions of production, belief and government that had grown up quite detached from European influence. For the first time the early sequences of conjectural history were available for comparative experimental study. 13 Eras were accessible by ship, and the curious observer could travel back and forth between them, discriminating as minutely as he pleased.
However, it soon became clear to Forster that it was not quite so simple. The map of humanity in the Pacific did not reveal an advancing set of coordinates between lines of latitude and stages of development, which is what he first hypothesised. Clearly some nations had done well, and others poorly; and even within one nation, such as Otaheite, a privileged class (the arioi) had thrived while those beneath (whom Forster suspected were the remains of a vanquished population) appeared less wealthy and physically smaller and darker. The regular four-part pattern was contradicted not only by examples of primitivism that were clearly derived, not original, but also by degeneration occurring in places of great natural amenity, often alongside manifest proof of its opposite. What is more, Forster was often indebted to brief meetings amidst inauspicious circumstances, hampered sometimes by his own irascible temper, for observations which he had to generalise if they were to make any sense. For example, his visit to Dusky Bay in New Zealand's South Island was made after a hideously uncomfortable voyage that coloured his view of the four quarrelsome people he met there, one of whom had a large wen on her cheek, surrounded by a landscape he found chaotic.
14 From our point of view it is one of Forster's strengths that whatever was problematic in his witnessing, as Nicholas Thomas has pointed out, 'tended to be paraded rather than disavowed.' 18 It was a trick of speech not limited to the natural historians. William Wales reported, 'Their features [were] not disagreeable and not in the least masculine; but one of them was rendered barely not frightfull by a large Wen which grew on her left Cheek'. 19 The double negative, or litotes, is a symptom of an uneasy relationship to space and time: the harvest of new specimens lies hidden in an impenetrable temperate rainforest; these primitive people are neither noble nor altogether ignoble, stuck in some siding of Whig history.
Many personal histories of the South Seas are indeterminate in the same way, often following the pattern of one of the most successful fictions ever invented: A man is driven ashore under inauspicious circumstances, contrives to preserve a miserable existence, grows happy, witnesses horrid feasts on human flesh, is terrified, forms a close association with a native, and not knowing when he is well off, decides to leave his island and return to Europe. Give or take a few de- 20 Ian Campbell has identified four broad categories of beach crossing, which may be summarised as the reluctant, the hybrid, the acculturated, and the transculturised.
21 Horace Holden's life on Tobi Island was pure hell; he was forced to survive on leaves and insects until he was so skeletal his bones broke through his 
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The same fantastic incoherence haunts all these tales, either because the transit of the beach is never made and experience remains inchoate, or because the crossing is achieved and the result is incommunicable to those who have no inkling of it. Maning's digressions are Shandean extravagances, all made at the expense of historical time and the European reader, and he calls the narrative effect dancing:
[B]ut I must confess I don't know any more about the right way to tell a story, than a native minister knows how to 'come' a war dance. I declare the mention of a war dance calls up a host of reminiscences [...] in such a way that no one but a few, a very few, pakeha Maori, can understand. Thunder!-but no; let me get ashore; how can I dance on the water, or before I ever knew how? 26 There is evidently a difference between petitionary dancing and impatient dancing. Inga Clendinnen makes a case for something in between, a sort of sympathetic dancing, when she tells the story of a British officer, William Bradley, whose men were danced at by Aborigines at Sydney Cove and who, being destitute of other means of communication, danced back at them, with everyone finally mingling in an extempore ball. 27 She represents this dancing as a demonstration of speechless goodwill, a provisional state of affairs dominated by hope for the best: not yet an achievement or a fact, more of an expectation. Perhaps the most perfect example of this dancing was organised by Edward Robarts on the beach at Tahauka, where the warriors of two tribes, the Huka and Pepani, were massed for war: 'Our drum beat for a dance. A great chieftain's daughter came down first. [...] I led her to my Party [...] I calld on two young men, sons of chieftains, to come down to dance before her. In return, two was sent from her side to dance to our ladies'. 28 This sort of dancing fits well into the category of beach exchange Greg Dening calls performance, which he distinguishes as a kind of instant ritual that works because it is suffused with sufficient energy to impart necessity and precision, or what J. L. Austin would call 'happiness' and Marshall Sahlins mana, to the spectacle. From the start, performance ruled the beach, whether it was the crude exhibition of power evident in the firing of guns or whether it was the arrival of an arioi performing troupe ready to give a pantomime, their drums beating and their flags streaming from canoes sitting just beyond the surf.
29 Anne Salmond has told us that Polynesians were brilliant improvisers, and at a moment's notice could re-enact some notable event, such as the clever theft of British equipment, to huge applause. On Tahiti these displays included mimicries of hornpipes and English country dances, danced back as it were to the first dancers of them.
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But how this back and forth of drama and dancing contributed to knowledge, apart from the instinctive knowledge of how to survive in unpredictable circumstances, it is hard to say. Dening finds an analogue for the beach in the no-man's land of the First World War, as described by Edmund Blunden, where he remembers, 'In this vicinity a peculiar difficulty would exist for the artist to select the sight, faces, words, incidents, which characterised the time. The art is rather to collect them, in their original form of incoherence'. 31 This advice resembles the preface of Herbert Guthrie-Smith's autobiography when, to summarise the history of the changes, both rapid and long-term, which overtook the land on which he was farming sheep in the Hawke's Bay 32 And how does he marshal that immensity? Why, as miracles such as those wrought by the earthquake of 1931which neatly severed every cigar in a closed box in his study without harming the box or breaking any of the windows in the house, and which then caused the whole chimney stack to fall in a curve off the roof, to come in at the verandah, then out again on to the path, without breaking the roof or the railings. With these momentous enigmas he can fix the attention of his reader and give the immensity of his particulars a chance. 33 They are agreeable to one of the first imagined sightings of things on a beach, facts without a context, so incoherent they might be taken equally for history We cannot post ourselves back in time'. 36 Two grievous errors are made here by Grenville, Clendinnen persuasively argues. The first is to cheapen the passion that ought to inspire history -the horror, the moral rage, the compassion -in favour of the illusion that we can share the feelings of people in the past who seem to be the same as we are now, Europeans on our side of the beach. The second is to set aside not only the cultural difference of Aborigines but also the difference of history. Two hundred years presents the same obstacle to the historian as tribal culture does to the settler; but both need to be tackled if justice is to be done. The question is, how? By dancing at the threshold? She suggests that dancing of Bradley's kind is a way of marshalling the immensity of what is witnessed but not known, a representation of things in their incoherence: a method of according facts a kind of miraculous singularity without being overwhelmed by them.
What one might then go on to ask is whether this has anything in common with history at all, and whether it is not a private romance, an accumulation of accidents arranged in no credible sequence, facts not necessarily connected and therefore not really facts at all-just like Hildebrand Bowman's. mythology is a fiction either invented by the savages themselves or by those who wish to render them interesting; and whatever the visitor is told it has scant connection with the actual state of affairs, which is emphatically not a state of nature. There is no truly primitive state of savagery to be observed, and what scoundrels such as Rousseau, or Scottish conjectural historians for that matter, dignify with the name of a state of nature is really always corrupt, for nobody grows out of the ground -and even if they did, their lack of pity, curiosity and letters would mean that what we mistook for innocence would really be imbecility. At the same time Johnson's repudiation of fieldwork reveals a canny but largely submerged estimate of what is at stake in the discussions generated by the elder Forster and Kames. For example, everyone agreed that savagery is always a relative estimate of progress or degeneration; for when Forster discovered what he took to be the degree zero of prehistoric life in the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, he was at length inclined to believe that humans so poor, so dull and so unlovely somehow must have been reduced to this condition. Clearly Johnson had read enough of the voyages to know that no one believed in an autochthonous origin of any Polynesian nation in the South Seas, that these were migratory cultures that had risen or fallen according to the amenity of the landfall or, in the case of the Rapanuians, their alleged profuseness, or for some other reason altogether. What Johnson wishes to impress upon the naïve and ardent Boswell is that the history of that rising and falling is purely conjectural, and that conjecture is worth nothing. Lord Monboddo's conjectures concerning the ape-like origins of humans he found not offensive but stupid: 'What strange narrowness of mind now is that, to think things we have not known, are better than the things which we have known' (p. 460). If he might be said to be testing any kind of theory, it was one that he embodied: his own version of stadial development where civil society reaches its apex in the rich material and intellectual culture of metropolitan London (Bowman's Luxo-Volupto in fact), a triumph of physical and mental exertion that was unequalled in the contemporary world. It caused Johnson great pleasure to catch sight of the silhouettes of Lord Mulgrave and Omai as they stood talking by a window, and to find he was not to be able to tell one from the other. 38 In his Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland (1775) he aimed to measure the distance separating the primitive stage of development of the region (hovering somewhere between pastoralism and subsistence farming) from the standards of politeness that he himself and his companion represented. His alpha and omega are old traditions and antiquated manners on the one side, and a modern, civil nation on the other.
Of his host at Anoch he reported that his life was 'merely pastoral', his wealth consisting entirely of 'one hundred sheep, as many goats, twelve milk-cows, and twenty-eight beeves ready for the drover'. 39 He explains how such a mountainous fastness defends 'the original, at least the oldest race of inhabitants' (p. 43); and so it is with a sort of comical vainglory he takes his first step towards Loch Ness and across the threshold of history: 'We were now to bid farewell to the luxury of travelling, and to enter a country upon which no wheel has ever rolled' (p. 29). Nevertheless he detects many signs of progress in the circulation of money and the reach of the law, concluding with apparent approval, 'There was perhaps never any change of national manners so quick, so great, and so general, as that which has operated in the Highlands, by the last conquest, and the subsequent laws' (p. 57). There is only one way for the Highlands to go, and that is rapidly into the present.
Such certainty about the virtue of momentum is undercut however by melancholy reflections: 'We came thither too late to see what we expected, a people of peculiar appearance, and a system of antiquated life' (p. 57). If Forster was troubled by evidence of time going forwards and backwards in the same place, no less is Johnson. When he beholds antiquated manners he is for the most part impatient with them, especially if they require him to go to bed on straw, to travel without wheels, or to listen to a pack of lies from people who will tell the curious traveller anything they think he wants to know. It is then that he catches a strong flavour of clan life and its 'muddy mixture of pride and ignorance' (p. 89). At the same time he reports the general discontent among Highlanders of all classes owing to the rise of rents, the plague of emigration, and the laws against wearing the plaid and the carrying of arms. He recurs to the same theme that Cook was to rehearse when on his return he saw Tahiti blasted by venereal disease, and accurately predicted in the South Seas the same miseries of disease and depopulation for the indigenous people that had been endured for so many centuries in the Americas. In a solemn moment 40 But Johnson is oppressed by these obstructions; until, that is, he sits down to write his book and comes to terms with them:
I sat down on a bank, such as a writer of romance might have delighted to feign. I had, indeed, no trees to whisper over my head; but a clear rivulet streamed at my feet. The day was calm, the air soft, and all was rudeness, silence, and solitude.
Before me, and on either side, were high hills, which, by hindering the eye from 33-7) . Alternatively, when he is shown a tree of insignificant size, but informed that there is a much larger one a few miles away, he recalls, 'I was still less delighted to hear that another tree was not to be seen nearer' (p. 10). What objectively he identifies as the intellectual poverty of a nation that has no historians (p. 50), or the informational vacuity of the Highland traveller who 'knows less as he hears more' (p. 51), is finally thoroughly internalised as his own inability to process facts that seem to belong to different eras, confounding his ability to distinguish between true knowledge and fiction. That is why he associates his narrative with romance.
Opulence, for example, is alive and well in the Highlands and all the more surprising for its sudden appearance amidst scenes of natural barrenness 41 This was the minstrelsy to which Johnson was prepared as it were to spread his kirtle. He compared the effect on the mind to the fictions of Gothic romance: 'Whatever is imaged in the wildest tale, if giants, dragons, and enchantments be expected, would be felt by him, who, wandering in the mountains without a guide, or upon the sea without a pilot, should be carried amidst his terror and uncertainty, to the hospitality and elegance of Raasay or Dunvegan' (p. 77). Despite his perpetual reminders to the reader of the ignorance of bards and genealogists in the Highlands, it is in these Gothic havens, watching the dancing to the accompaniment of the billows, that Johnson learned the tales of the McLeods and the traditions of the Macleans and had no difficulty in believing them as family history. Although he warns us not to fill the vacuum of information with the pseudo-primitivism of Ossian, he spends pages discussing evidence of second sight. Of this faculty, which might have been suspected of being the most romantic of all, and well adapted to the curious collision of the past and the future he was experiencing, Johnson says, 'The local frequency of a power, which is nowhere totally unknown [...] where we are unable to decide by antecedent reason, we must be content to yield to the force of testimony' (p. 107). No conjectural historian could be more ready to admit that things we have not known are more interesting than those we have; no ethnographer could more willingly accept the testimony of native informants; no witness could be more partial in admitting evidence whose grounds of authenticity (partly known
